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Abstract. Access control in distributed networking environments, such
as peer-to-peer and ad hoc networks, presents a difficult challenge since
these new paradigms assume a self-organizing group structure with peer
equality where no central service provider is needed. In this paper we
present an exhaustive description of all possible scenarios for an access
control procedure in a peer-to-peer environment depending on the in-
volvement of the peers during the registration process. We discuss the
main properties of every scenario and we provide a literature review of
the main proposals in the field of access control for peer-to-peer and ad-
hoc networks. Such exhaustive study allows us to identify which scenarios
are not efficiently solved in terms of group access control.
Keywords: Access control, peer-to-peer authentication, distributed sys-
tems security.
1 Introduction
The enormous increase in devices’ interconnection capabilities has permit-
ted the expansion of technologies such as peer-to-peer or ad-hoc networks.
Even though the former is entirely related to software and the latter to the
physical devices themselves, both share the same basic principle: a group
of users are able to create a communications framework from scratch
without the need of a central service provider. This is achievable via the
aggregation of resources each one of them provide, creating a completely
distributed collaborative environment based in a flat hierarchy of users,
without any kind of centralization.
At first, applications from such technologies assumed a completely
open environment where all peers may access everyone’s resources with
the only limitation of having other peers within reach. However, under
some circumstances a group of users may need to create a closed com-
munity, limiting access to the shared resources to the members of the
same community. In this case, we are no longer in an open environment
and several security issues need to be addressed in order to protect some
group’s resources.
Different security solutions are based on a central service provider,
often represented as a trusted third party, but in the case of peer-to-
peer and ad-hoc network environments it is very important to avoid such
approach, or at least minimize the system’s dependency on very specific
peers, trying to keep equality between them.
Several studies on this field are summarized in [1] and the basic re-
quirements for peer-to-peer security are specified in [2]. The need for the
concept of group membership is specifically the main focus in some cases
such as in [3]. However, the fact that peer-to-peer networks operate at
higher levels lets us focus much more in this layer, that of user equal-
ity, since it is not directly needed to tackle some big issues such as node
physical proximity or real-time device mobility.
In this paper we identify different scenarios for group access based
on the involvement of peers during the access process. Such classification
allows a clear study of each scenario in terms of peer relevance within
the group. Specifically, we will focus on the mechanisms involving group
registration and authentication.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On one hand, the paper
presents a classification of each scenario based on performance proper-
ties, thus allowing application designers to choose which scenario fulfills
his requirements and then which are the literature proposals that can be
applied. On the other hand, the exhaustive classification of the differ-
ent possible scenarios has allowed to identify some situations where the
proposals that can be found in the literature do completely or efficiently
solve the group access procedure.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the different
scenarios for group access in a distributed collaborative environment. In
Section 3 we discuss the properties and constrains of the defined scenar-
ios. Section 4 provides a literature review in order to identify which are
the existing solutions for every different scenario. Section 5 presents the
concluding remarks.
2 Group access scenarios identification.
In order to study the security issues related with group access control
in peer-to-peer applications (or ad-hoc networking), we first identify the
possible scenarios resulting from different levels of involvement of the
peers within the group during the access process of a new member.
The access process can be split in two steps: registration and authen-
tication, that can be defined as follows.
Registration: The process by which a new peer applies to be accepted
into the group. During this process the new peer may receive any cre-
dentials (keys, passwords, tokens) that will be needed at later stages
to prove he belongs to the group. It is assumed that registration is
performed only once, and, if the process succeeds, the new peer will
be considered a member of the group afterwards.
Authentication: The process by which a user connects to a group, prov-
ing he is one of its members. The previous registration process pro-
vides the needed evidences for the authentication procedure. In this
environment we identify connection as the possibility to share some
resources.
As we pointed out in Section 1, since we are restricted into peer-to-
peer applications (or ad-hoc networking), registration and authentication
must be performed by peers of the group without assuming any external
party. For that reason it is useful to provide the following notation:
– Let G = {A1, A2, · · · , An} be the peers of the group G.
– Let B be the new peer who wants to access the group.
– Let ΓR = {Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Air ; ij ∈ {1, · · · , n};∀j = 1, · · · , r} be the
registration structure within a group. That is, the set of r peers who
are allowed to register a new peer.
– Let ΓRB = {Ak1 , Ak2 , · · · , Akp ; kj ∈ {i1, i2, · · · , in};∀j = 1, · · · , p} be
the set of p peers who did register B, where it is obvious that p ≤ r
and ΓRB ⊆ ΓR holds.
– Let ΓA = {Al1 , Al2 , · · · , Alq ; lj ∈ {1, · · · , n} : ∀j = 1, · · · , q} be the set
of q peers who may authenticate B.
– Let ΓAB = {Am1 , Am2 , · · · , Amt ;mj ∈ {l1, l2, · · · , lq};∀j = 1, · · · , t} be
the set of t peers who did authenticate B, where it is obvious that
t ≤ q and ΓAB ⊆ ΓA holds.
Both the registration and authentication steps present several com-
mon issues and challenges that must be taken into account in order to
evaluate the different scenarios we will present:
– Peer equality. Avoiding that some peer have more authoritative power
than some other ones in the same group. In an ideal peer-to-peer
environment, equality should be maximized.
– Availability. Since peer-to-peer networks are highly dynamic, the num-
ber of peers connected to the group in an specific instant may change
very quickly over time, which may create situations where there are
not enough peer available in order to let B enter the group.
– Acceptance policies. Enforcing some policy in order to decide whether
a peer is accepted into the group. This issue is specially interesting in
the registration scenario, since we start with no previous knowledge
from B (in an authentication scenario we have some knowledge ac-
quired during registration) and such policy must be agreed between
all the members in the group.
– Collusion. To a certain degree covered by the previous issue, taking
into account that under the case that some peers are compromised, it
may be possible to leverage the acceptance policy in order to let any
peer enter the group.
Since we are interested in the scenarios determined by the involvement
of peers, we differentiate between two cases: single-peer and collabo-
rative. The former assumes only one peer is needed in the process, that
is p = 1 for registration and t = 1 for authentication. On the other hand,
the collaborative case considers p > 1 and t > 1 respectively. Such distinc-
tion has been made because the specific properties of each case strongly
impact the system and the security tools needed for every solution, as it
is shown in Section 4.
In the next subsection the different scenarios for registration and au-
thentication are described.
2.1 Registration scenarios
Based on the single-peer and collaborative distinction defined above, the
possible scenarios for the registration process are summarized in Table 1.
r = 0 0 < r < n r = n
ΓRB = {Ai; for some Ai ∈ ΓR} case p = 1 1R 2Rs 3Rs
ΓRB = {Ak1 , · · · , Akp ; kj ∈ {i1, · · · , in};∀j = 1, · · · , p} case 1 < p ≤ r 1R 2Rc 3Rc
Table 1. Registration Scenarios
Scenario 1R: This case, where ΓR = ∅, is a degenerated case since p ≤ r
and r = 0 and p ≥ 1. This case accepts two different interpretations.
The first one considers the group G as a closed group, no registration
process exists so no new peers may be registered. Only the initial peers
inside the group will ever be part of it. Since there’s no available registra-
tion process, both a collaborative effort or single-peer registration may
be considered the same case.
The second interpretation is the opposite, and assumes that the group
is completely open, no registration process is required. By default, any-
body is part of the group and according to the previous registration defin-
ition, any peer may create its own credentials by himself, since nobody is
responsible for registration. It is worth mention that, under this scenario,
the concept of group as a segregate set of peers does not really exist, so
it does not really make sense in a group access study, but it is listed for
the sake of completeness.
Scenario 2Rs: In this scenario, only a subset of peers may register new
ones, but each one of them may do it on its own (p = 1).
Scenario 3Rs: This scenario tries to keep equality between peers, by
allowing every user in G to register a new peer without restrictions.
Collaborative scenarios. 2Rc and 3Rc: In both cases a minimum
number of peers p > 1 must agree before registering B. Such strategy
tries to minimize misbehavior from single malign peers (or compromised
ones), since they are not able to register B alone.
The main difference between cases 2Rc and 3Rc is the fact that the
latter does not make any distinction between peers, since all of them may
register B (r = n). Furthermore, a limit situation is achieved when p = r
that means all peers in ΓR must agree in registering new members.
2.2 Authentication scenarios
The authentication process allows B to prove his group membership and
it will be performed after the registration process.
We divide the authentication scenarios using the same approach used
in the registration process, that is single-peer cases and collaborative
cases. However, since the authentication process is based on a previous
registration procedure, the scenarios here are based on a three tiered ap-
proach (see Figure 1). Now we may take into account the set of peers
responsible for registering B, ΓRB , when defining the set of authenticating
peers.
Fig. 1. Registration tiers
Despite the exact figure drawn, it is worth mention that we are not assuming only the
case ΓRB ⊂ ΓR ⊂ G since equality may be possible (ΓRB ⊆ ΓR ⊆ G).
Then for the authentication process, the possible scenarios are the
ones described in Table 2.
t = 1 t > 1
ΓA = ∅ 1A 1A
ΓA ⊆ {A1, · · · , An} = G 2As 2Ac
ΓA ⊆ ΓR 3As 3Ac
ΓA ⊆ ΓRB 4As 4Ac
Table 2. Authentication Scenarios
Scenario 1A: In this scenario there is no authentication process. That
implies the registration process becomes completely useless and only makes
sense under the 1R scenario. Again, this scenario may be interpreted in
two completely different ways.
If we assume that the authentication process provides a mechanism
for connecting to the group, then the lack of any authentication process
means nobody may connect to the group, so the group becomes closed.
On the other hand, this scenario may be regarded as absolutely free
access: any peer will be considered part of the group (being able to share
resources) by default. Again, the concept of group itself vanishes.
Scenario 2As: In this scenario any peer may authenticate B by itself,
thus providing maximum flexibility to the system by increasing its vul-
nerability to compromised peers.
Scenario 3As: In this case, only peers who were allowed to register new
peers may authenticateB. This scenario will typically be based from a 2Rs
or 2Rc registration case, where only a subset of peers, ΓR, may register
new ones (r < n). Otherwise, ΓR = G, so we would be at scenario 2As.
Scenario 4As: In this scenario, we consider that only peers who took
part in the registration process, ΓRB , may authenticate B.
It is interesting to note that this scenario highly depends from the
registration case. Increasing the number of peers in ΓRB restricts the reg-
istration procedure but provides more flexibility to the authentication
process since more peers will be available (notice that this is only true
for the single-peer case where t = 1).
This scenario may be simplified under some circumstances. When
ΓRB = G in the 3Rc case, it becomes a 2As scenario, whereas in the
case that ΓRB = Γ
R in the 2Rc case, it becomes a 3As scenario.
Collaborative scenarios. 2Ac, 3Ac, 4Ac: In all these collaborative
authentication scenarios t > 1 peers must agree before B is granted ac-
cess into the group. The description is basically the same as the one for
registration scenarios (see subsection 2.1).
Mixed scenarios: Each of the base scenarios previously defined may
be combined producing a new subset of scenarios in which peers from
explicitly different tiers may authenticate B before granting access to the
group1.
The different possibilities for mixed scenarios are shown in Table 3
where the + symbol will denote that the produced blended scenario is
composed using the base scenarios indicated. For example, under scenario
3Ac+4As, B would be considered authenticated if t > 1 peers in ΓR agree
or t = 1 in ΓRB agrees.
In fact, mixed scenario are quivale t to giving different levels of trust
to he authenticating peers in each tier (similar to assigning weights).
However, these 20 mixed scenarios may be simplified, since some of
the base cases are dependant because ΓRB ⊆ ΓR ⊆ G holds. In order to
show this simplification, we will define the following terms for this section:
– Let t1 be the number of peers who must agree in a 2A scenario in
order to authenticate B (t1 = 1 in 2As and t1 > 1 in 2Ac).
– Let t2 be the number of peers who must agree in a 3A scenario in
order to authenticate B (t2 = 1 in 3As and t2 > 1 in 3Ac).
1 Obviously, scenario 1A does not apply here.
2As+3As 2Ac+3As 2As+3Ac 2Ac+3Ac
2As+4As 2Ac+4As 2As+4Ac 2Ac+4Ac
3As+4As 3Ac+4As 3As+4Ac 3Ac+4Ac
2As+3As+4As 2As+3As+4Ac 2As+3Ac+4As 2As+3Ac+4Ac
2Ac+3As+4As 2Ac+3As+4Ac 2Ac+3Ac+4As 2Ac+3Ac+4Ac
Table 3. Initial Mixed Scenarios
– Let t3 be the number of peers who must agree in a 4A scenario in
order to authenticate B (t3 = 1 in 4As and t3 > 1 in 4Ac).
Then, it holds that:
– Whenever t1 ≤ t2, all mixed scenarios which include a 2A and 3A
become a 2A scenario, since ΓR ⊆ G.
– Whenever t1 ≤ t3, all mixed scenario which include a 2A and 4A
become a 2A scenario, since ΓRB ⊆ G.
– Whenever t2 ≤ t3, all mixed scenario which include a 3A and 4A
become a 3A scenario, since ΓRB ⊆ ΓR.
Then, Table 3 can be simplified into Table 4.
2As 2Ac+3As 2As 2Ac+3Ac*
2As 2Ac+4As 2As 2Ac+4Ac*
3As 3Ac+4As 3As 3Ac+4Ac*
2As 2As 2As 2As
2Ac+3As 2Ac+3As 2Ac+3Ac+4As* 2Ac+3Ac+4Ac*
Table 4. Simplified Mixed Scenarios
After this transformation, we can see that there are actually only 8
mixed scenarios: 2Ac+3As, 2Ac+3Ac, 2Ac+4As, 2Ac+4Ac, 3Ac+4As,
3Ac+4Ac, 2Ac+3Ac+4As, 2Ac+3Ac+4Ac. In fact, some of them can be
further simplified for specific instances of t1, t2 or t3, according to the
previous rules. For example, a 2Ac+3Ac where t1 = 2 and t2 = 4 may be
simplified to a 2Ac scenario (with t1 = 2).
3 Scenario properties and constraints
Up to this point, we have defined the different available scenarios regard-
ing group access control. In this section, we discuss the different properties
of every scenario, as well as its constraints, in order to asses how they
may impact the system.
Scenarios 1R and 1A, where no real access control exists, will be just
briefly described, as they do not deserve much interest. Under a com-
pletely open approach there is neither real security nor groups. On the
other hand, the opposite scenario, a closed one, is the least dynamic but
provides tighter security. Both cases are the easiest to implement, and
strictly speaking, keep peer equality.
Single-peer scenarios are the ones which offer maximum flexibility and
responsiveness, at the cost of presenting a single point of failure. Only the
corruption of one peer is needed to compromise the system.
In collaborative scenarios, for both registration and authentication,
higher security is achieved since they are resistant to peer misbehavior
or compromise. However, a protocol for collaborative agreement may be
needed. Such protocol should be based in some kind of policy upon which
agreement between peers is achieved. This extra protocol implies some
overhead, then reducing responsiveness.
Another constraint in the collaborative environments is the fact that,
under some circumstances, connection may become impossible unless a
minimum number of peers are connected to the group, creating a sort
of chicken-egg problem. There are two different approaches in order to
minimize this constraint. The most straightforward one would be using
collaborative parameters (p for registration, t for authentication) which
are dynamic, allowing changes in its base requirements during group op-
erations. This is specially critical in registration scenarios when the group
itself is still establishing. Another possibility would be delegation upon
other peers, which would temporally act as proxies of some number of
peers in ΓR or ΓA.
Taking another approach, the different scenarios may be evaluated
from a peer equality point of view. In scenarios where ΓR = G or ΓA =
G (3R, 2A respectively) peer equality is preserved. On the other hand,
scenarios in which a restricted set of peers control group access (2R, 3A,
4A, where ΓR ⊂ G or ΓA ⊂ G respectively) lead to different degrees of
inequality. Such degrees will require group policies in order to determine
which peers belong to these restricted sets.
4 Security proposals for access control in distributed
environments
In this section we provide a literature review that will allow us to deter-
mine which security schemes provide a solution for the different scenarios
we defined. Due to the paper length constraints, we only take into account
those proposals that use public key cryptography since these approaches
allow to address other security issues such us privacy or data integrity.
Symmetric key proposals such as those in [21] are not considered.
Obviously, scenarios 1R and 1A are not discussed, since in that case
there is no real security scheme to be used (or its implementation is
trivial).
4.1 CA based approaches
A widely accepted way to solve access control is using a certification
authority (CA), which will provide digital public key certificates to the
rightful members of the group. These certificates will serve as a credential
for the authentication procedure. Different specific implementations are
needed for each scenario.
Scenario 2Rs when r = 1 might be considered the most basic one,
as it is the classical CA approach [4], with a single point of registra-
tion. In this scenario we must completely rely on the peer which provides
CA operations. In order to allow B to be registered, the peer providing
CA operations must be connected to the group, and this feature may
not be desirable in a completely peer-to-peer environment. Despite this
shortcoming, some peer-to-peer applications are based on this centralized
model [5].
Scenarios 2Rs and 3Rs when r > 1 are exactly the same. In this case,
we are implicitly stating that the CA is replicated in each one of the peers
which may provide access (ΓR in 2Rs and G in 3Rs) since every peer must
be able to provide the same functionalities as a single CA. This scenarios
greatly improve availability, but are extremely vulnerable, since now the
points of failure are equal to the number of peers who may register B (r
and n for each case, respectively), as stated in [6].
Scenarios 2Rc and 3Rc are the ones that offer a better trade off be-
tween availability and vulnerability, specially since we can choose different
values for p and r for every specific case. Because of these reasons, this
cases are the most used approach for group access in distributed environ-
ments [6–9]. Usually, the usage of threshold cryptography [10] is the way
a collaborative registration procedure is solved. There are several ways
to split a private key between several peers so it cannot be computed
without the cooperation of minimum number of peers [11–13]. The main
drawback of such approach is the rekeying problem. When a new peer
joins ΓR, the threshold shares must be recomputed which may be a prob-
lem in a highly dynamic group, although some efficient proposals exist
[7].
In [6] a proposal for distributed CA-based access control is presented,
where a set of special server peers provide CA capabilities. Choosing
which peers will act as a server determines whether the scenario is 2Rc or
3Rc. The proposed solution also takes into account two other important
aspects in a distributed CA. On one hand, it allows to operate in an asyn-
chronous mode when not all peers which conform the CA are connected
at the same time. On the other hand, it provides proactive security via
share refreshing [14] in order to avoid that mobile adversaries may have
a very long time to compromise enough peers.
Another similar approach, also based on a threshold cryptosystem,
is provided in [7] and later improved in [8]. The main difference with
the other proposals is that no special server peers are needed for CA
operation, so this solution falls into the 3Rc scenario.
In all of these cases that use a CA approach, once the new peer has
been provided with a certificate, it is easy to complete the authentication
procedures for scenarios 2As, 3As or 4As, via a simple challenge-response
protocol [15]. Unfortunately, under single peer authentication each peer
becomes a single point of failure and is open to man-in-the-middle at-
tacks. In [16] these problems are highlighted and the authors propose
an authentication scheme based on a byzantine systems, as introduced
by Lamport [17], in order to avoid them. The use of these collaborative
proposals for authenticating a new peer would be encompassed within
scenarios 2Ac, 3Ac and 4Ac.
Collaborative registration scenarios may also be complemented using
byzantine systems. In this case, they add fault tolerance to a distributed
CAs. An approach in that sense may be found in [9]. Again, this case is
much nearer to a 2Rc scenario, since all peers are not equal.
Mixed scenarios are not considered in the literature. However, they
could be solved in the same way as a collaborative scenario.
4.2 Self-organized based approaches
In the self-organized based approaches,B is accepted according on whether
some of the peers in the group individually trust him and established trust
relationships between the different peers in G. In this case, peers only rep-
resent themselves and never act as a higher level entity such as CA. Each
peer manages its own individual keys and is able to sign certificates with
them. This approach is the one used in the PGP model [18], based on a
web of trust.
Literature in CA-based systems argues that self-organized based ap-
proaches are not scalable and they are focused on small groups of peers
[7]. Nevertheless, we consider that self-organized based solutions repre-
sent an interesting approach since they allow to maximize peer autonomy.
Furthermore, they also mitigate the bootstrap problems during the ini-
tialization phase in a distributed CA, at the creation of the initial private
key that has to be distributed.
In [19, 20], the author’s proposal is based on the verification of cer-
tificate chains, in order to assess whether B is part of the group. In this
case, when B wants to register to G, any peer, Ai, can issue a certificate
to B generated with Ai’s private key. Reciprocally, B also generates a
certificate to Ai. This process is named certificate exchange and is the
way a trust relationship is created. At a later stage, any peer Aj in G
may authenticate B by trying to find a trust relationship between Aj and
Ai. This solution falls in scenarios 3Rs and 2As. Notice that scenario 2Rs
works in the same way that 3Rs but we will only accept trust relationship
between B and those peers in ΓR. The rest of single-peer authentication
scenarios, 3As and 4As, can be solved like 2As.
To our knowledge, there are no proposals that deal with collaborative
scenarios in a self-organized based approach. For the registration process,
2Rc and 3Rc, it would typically involve that some number of trust re-
lationships between peers in ΓR or G respectively must exist before B
is granted access. That means that at least p different peers must sign
B’s public key. It is worth mention that in this process there is no need
for a collaborative agreement protocol between peers in ΓRB during regis-
tration since the establishment of every trust relationship can be created
independently. That implies the registration procedure can be performed
asynchronously.
In the case of authentication in collaborative scenarios, 2Ac, 3Ac and
4Ac, there is no distinction from the CA-based approach since trust re-
lationship validation must be performed by t > 1 peers in ΓA using an
agreement protocol.
Mixed scenarios are considered the same case that collaborative sce-
narios since an agreement protocol is needed between peers of different
tiers.
5 Conclusions and further research
In this paper we have presented an exhaustive description of the different
possible scenarios for an access procedure in a peer-to-peer environment
depending on the involvement of the peers during the registration process.
Furthermore, we have discussed the main properties of every scenario
from a performance point of view (availability, responsiveness, misbehav-
ior tolerance,...) and also from a peer equality approach. Finally, we have
provided a literature review of the main proposals in the field of access
security for peer-to-peer and ad-hoc network. We have identified in which
defined scenario can be classified each proposal.
Further research will be focused on providing efficient and complete
solutions for those scenarios that are not sufficiently solved with the cur-
rent available solutions. Furthermore, we should carefully deal with other
group operations that impact on access control like for instance peer with-
drawal from the group, which in a public key scenario basically means
certification revocation.
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